Urging a Court to Silence Advocacy in a First Amendment Case
In a recent pretrial filing, defense counsel asked the Court to “caution all parties” against extrajudicial statements, citing one of my writings as an example (Viewpoint Discrimination in Plain Sight, Dec. 29, 2025). That writing was not a social media post. It was a long-form blog essay published on my civic-advocacy website and in a digital newspaper. A distinction that matters.
The request to “caution” speech was advanced solely by counsel for Attorney Bolton; it was not joined by counsel for Attorney Leonard.
A blog and newspaper essay are not social media. A blog is not algorithmically amplified. It is not boosted. It is not pushed to feeds. It does not appear in timelines, recommendations, or notifications. It is accessed only by readers who intentionally visit the site. My blog has no paid promotion, no automated distribution, and no additional outreach. I did not repost the article on my Facebook Good-gov page. I do not engage in commenting on the digital newspaper.
Calling a static blog post and digital newspaper “social media” may be rhetorically convenient, but it is factually inaccurate.
Blogs have long been treated by courts as analogous to op-eds, essays, and citizen commentary, forms of protected political speech. They are not governed by the same assumptions about virality or audience reach that sometimes accompany social media platforms. Nor are they presumptively read by jurors.
More importantly, no court order prohibits me, as a civil plaintiff, from writing about my own experience, my own case, or the public issues it raises. No protective order was violated. No confidential discovery was disclosed. No jurors were addressed. No witnesses were contacted. No rules were cited because none were broken.
What was cited was viewpoint.
My writing criticized how “civility” standards have been selectively enforced by city officials, used aggressively against one speaker, me, while ignored when applied to others, namely a seated Alderman. That criticism is central to my case and to broader First Amendment concerns. It is uncomfortable for those accused of enforcing decorum unevenly, but discomfort is not prejudice, and criticism is not misconduct.
When advocacy speech is met with a request that the Court “caution” the speaker, it raises a serious concern. Courts are rightly cautious about targeted speech restraints, especially when they arise in response to one party’s viewpoint rather than any demonstrated threat to trial fairness.
A blanket or targeted order restricting a litigant’s public commentary, absent findings, absent necessity, and absent tailoring, would raise significant constitutional questions. Courts have long recognized that prior restraints on speech require a high showing and must be narrowly drawn. Generalized unease with criticism does not meet that standard.
The justice system does not require silence from litigants. It requires fairness in the courtroom. Those goals are not in conflict.
I will continue to respect the Court, its process, and the integrity of the jury system. I will also continue to write, carefully, accurately, and responsibly, about matters of public concern, including my own experience navigating a system that too often treats dissent as disruption or criminal activity worthy of an arrest.
Calling that “social media” does not make it so. And seeking to restrain it does not make it improper.